something syria this way comes (finally).

Better 200,000 lives late than never…



Last night, Obama announced the US will intervene in Iraq and Syria under the authority granted by the AUMF:

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) In General. -- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.
(1) Specific statutory authorization. -- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

Two years late at the most forgiving, and with the FSA on its last legs in Aleppo, maybe too late…

For over four years now, I’ve watched, hoped, and teared up as Syria bled, disintegrated, and hemorrhaged 10 million refugees. We should’ve been the FSA’s air force long ago, but instead I found myself envying my peers’ ability to otherize away others’ suffering: “You can’t help people by bombing them;” “We should lead by example here before we go there;” and “Iraq”. Always over and over again, “Iraq,” as though no humanitarian intervention could ever work again because “Iraq”.

America has spent the last few years paralyzed. In the pendulum swings of a fickle American worldview, hopelessly informed by its own narrow foreign policy experience, the lessons of 13 years ago seem lost. Emboldened by a war weary America wishfully pretending faraway suffering can remain forever far away, as it was pretending on the eve of the 11th, the scourge of Islamism has run rampant with impunity, more ascendant today than ever.

Advocating intervention in September 2012, I wrote:

Isolationism is never a good idea, unless you want a world that suffers recurring existential wars. Ignoring tyranny until it directly threatens America or Americans is a guaranteed way to allow expansionist ideologies to reach their apex before being confronted, not to mention espouses something of a nationalist moral double standard.

Now that the US has allowed ISIS’s brutal and expansionist ideology to grow substantially before being confronted, America is halfheartedly muddling to confront it.



Last night, Obama made a barely convincing case (for the second time). As Obama cited an ambiguous case for American exceptionalism – that America must intervene qua America, and Americans should support intervention qua Americans – I found myself so immured in sympathy to the Syrians qua humanity that an argument qua Americans seemed like some sort of strange aside.

As Obama launched into a tirade about America, he lost me, so let me make my own case for intervention. To quote my latest intellectual hero:

I am responsible even for those who are not in any form of contractual relationship with me, or who do not form part of my community, or my nation, or who are not covered by the same legal framework as me. This helps to understand, for example, how I can be responsible for those who live at a distance from me, who are under a different form of political organisation, or those who are stateless. In Levinas’ framework, even those we never meet, those whose names and faces we do not know, present us with a demand. It is, then, a question of accepting our global interdependence and even our obligation to protect the lives of those we do not know. For Levinas, this primary obligation is expressed through what we commonly call commandments, “Thou shall not kill”: a requirement to preserve life. This does not mean that I can or should preserve the life of every individual (of course I cannot do so, and to imagine I could would be unhealthy, it would imply some sort of narcissism, a certain messianism), but rather that I should think about what kind of political structures we need to sustain life and minimise those forms of violence that extinguish it. This does not mean I am capable of making these structures come into existence - responsibility is not the same as efficacy - but rather that I can fight for a world that maximises the possibility of preserving and sustaining life and minimises the possibility of those forms of violence that, illegitimately, take life, or at least reduce the conditions that make it possible for this to happen. –Judith Butler

To make a case around seperable American interests is nonsensical; there can be no difference between my interests and another’s in the realm of universals, because universality entails inseparability. While politically unpalatable, America is not the indispensible nation to the extent the world submits, America is indispensible to the extent it submits to the world, in service of universal human rights and liberal internationalism.

Narrowing what constitutes America’s interests away from universality and into a shortsighted opposition is a recurring habit of political convenience. America as opposition once led the US to declare victory in Afghanistan when communism was defeated, and abandon an illiberal Afghanistan to a breeding ground for Al Qaeda. That same narrowing has more recently caused us to abandon Libya, Iraq, and Syria, and move the goal posts away from universal liberalism and towards wherever history happens to stand when people become impatient.

Haughty words can evoke the right emotions, but they can’t write the right history, a history in which Syria and Iraq are secular, liberal, and free from both ISIS and Assad. Last night’s speech is a start, but a speech can’t force America to fight for its ideals, rightly defined as unambiguously liberal and inherently universal. The dialectic is still obsessed with difference: who America fights against, but not who or what America fights for.

While many spent today thinking of 2,000 Americans that died 13 years ago, I thought of the 200,000 Syrians that didn’t have to. Still, a liberal Syria remains unspoken, and while we refuse to speak of what we fight for, we are universally and chronically haunted by what we must fight against.

something syria this way comes. (continued.)

A couple months ago, I posted that an intervention was imminent. Okay, well now it's really imminent, but way too late. The way I see it, the US and the West really dropped the ball on Syria. (Should've dropped the bombs sooner.)

When the revolution began in Syria, it hadn't taken on the sectarian and extremist tone it has now. The rebels were split between moderate Islamists (like the Muslim Brotherhood) and good old-fashioned secular liberals. Had they won a swift victory, I think you would've seen a Libya-like success story with a moderate democratic government replacing Assad. The US could've made it happen at pretty low cost, and would've garnered a ton of both loyalty and credibility with the incoming regime, and likewise the incoming regime could've benefited from US advice and backing. (Not to mentions tens of thousands of lives would've been saved.)

Back in November 2011-ish, the rebels were basically a united Free Syrian Army, relatively loyal to the Syrian National Council. (Al-Nusra didn't even exist.) The membership of the SNC was public, and like I was saying, it had some moderate Islamists and some great secular liberals. Even some Alawites supported the revolution.

But this was all against the backdrop of US presidential elections, and Republicans were already using Libya as a political attack. It was a political decision not to intervene, as it might've cost Obama the presidency. As time went on, things got shittier. The rebels became more radical, foreign fighters poured in, both sides pushed the sectarian line for their own purposes, cities turned to rubble, refugees poured out, and the death toll mounted. All of this was completely unnecessary, but unfortunately, it's too late now.

And the worst part is, there's no option left nearly good as intervention was back then. Today, the rebel ranks swell with extremist Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda) shitheads, so there's really no one to support, yet non-intervention means losing all credibility when it comes to forbidding the use of WMDs. It's either help the extremists rebelling against Assad, who will use their victories to commit genocide against Alawites and impose Sharia Law, or let the genocidal autocrat use chemical weapons unchecked, setting a pretty terrible precedent for anyone else that that would defy America's red line on WMDs.

That said, what'll happen? After I broke ranks with the Economist on the Egyptian coup (I'm all for the coup), we're back on the same page about Syria. At this point, the US has to intervene to save face. (The red line, use of chemical weapons, has been crossed.) But with no one to support, they don't want to deliver victory to Islamist extremists. So they'll do something light, something that doesn't tip many scales, and something that just allows them to say "Look, we back up our words." If there's a way we can still bring victory to the moderate rebels in the FSA and sideline Al-Nusra, than I pray the dummies at the CIA figure it out before we intervene. If not, I'm basically expecting a really expensive PR fireworks show.

That's it for now. If you really must have more, I never posted this gem, but here's a Facebook argument where I called for intervention back in the good old days:

September 27, 2012

Yes, exactly what we need: another US-led bombing campaign in the Middle East in support of a nebulous group of rebels that probably hate us.

5 Reasons to Intervene in Syria Now

www.nytimes.com

President Obama needs to apply his own doctrine on foreign conflict spots where it would benefit the United States most: Syria.720

Jack: Can't we mind our own business? If conflict doesn't spill over borders I see no reason to be involved.

Elliott: We better start minding our own business.

Jack: Kony 2013!

Erin: Well spoken Elliott.

Chris Adell: intervene.

isolationsism is never a good idea, unless you want a world that suffers recurring existential wars. ignoring tyranny until it directly threatens america or americans is guaranteed way to allow expansionist ideologies to reach their apex before being confronted, not to mention espouses something of a nationalist moral double standard.

i understand the impetus for isolationism. america is the reluctant empire because it is the world's first liberal empire. the reluctance arises from liberalism's inherent inclination to "live and let live," but the empire arose from the occasional (and existentially necessary) realization that the containment policy of george f. kennan is a surefire way to fight forever and never win.

the best defense is a good offense, and a good offense means fostering liberalism around the world. to spurn global liberalism in the name of american liberalism (isolationism) would be a fatal mistake for the american empire.

as for the particulars of your "another bombing campaign," i would assume you're talking about libya? great americans and many brave libyans lost their lives, but because of them libya is so far a success story.

Elliott: Adell, there are plenty of other ways to intervene besides bombing and support of nebulous rebels. You sound like a pre-Iraq invasion neo-con. Look how well that turned out. There is no existential threat to the United States in the Middle East right now other than our own foolish, interventionist foreign policy, which has had the comprehensive effect of alienating the entire region. We intervened in Iran in the 1950s to remove a democratically elected president, and replaced him with an autocrat whose policies fueled the Iranian revolution. We've tacitly supported the Assad family for generations because we know that Assad is more predictable than the Sunnis who might replace him, and what we really care about is maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis Israel. We supported Mubarak for thirty years (Egypt was the second largest recipient of US direct foreign aid behind Israel) and, because of our support for Mubarak's brutalist regime, we managed to ensure the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood and still more radical elements of Egypt's constellation of political Islam-motivated groups, who are now something less than our friends. And no, I'm not talking about Libya—I'm talking about Syria (read the article). Hence "another," Libya being the first. I'm not advocating isolationism (as if we've ever been isolationist anyway, since we've worn big pants post-WW1). I'm advocating diplomacy and humanitarian aid in lieu of bombs and bullets; I'm advocating a major investment in the capacity of our State Department and a divestment from our military. I'm advocating a culture of fixing our own problems first before we attempt to fix the "existential" problems of others. I'm arguing that American intervention—as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Vietnam, Israel-Palestine, etc.—creates false power dynamics that prolong and complicate conflicts. I'm advocating that we grant autonomy and agency to the citizens of the world and stop pretending that we know better than they do, or that it's our white man's burden to fix their problems. Because, guess what, it never works.

Jack: Some top CIA terrorism analysts of all people have more or less said what Elliott is saying. American Exceptionalism isn't exceptionally good, and in the end no matter how unpallatable it may be all nations are responsible for taking care of their own domestic problems. We are not world police

Jack: Also my Kony comment was totally sarcastic. I think it's a perfect example of how dangerous and expensive counterinsurgency wars start.

Elliott: I think you're right Jack. It's interesting to me that one of the reasons Democrats supported expansion of the Afghan war was out of fear that abandoning Afghanistan would throw Afghanistan's women back into the clutches of the Taliban. As if spreading the insurgency to far-flung corners of hitherto peaceful Afghanistan (Kunduz, Baghlan, etc.) made Afghanistan safer for women, or for anyone else? Civilian casualties skyrocketed. So did US casualties and US debt.

Paul: Spent three weeks in Syria. "Israel and its American puppets are allied with Assad." When I mentioned the US interest in weakening Hezbollah and Iran I was kicked out of Free Syria. Many of the Free Syrian Army have lost family fighting against the US in Iraq. The Jihadist group I spent a night with called the Taliban brothers. They don't probably hate the US. They do. Proceed accordingly.

Chris Adell: i'm not a pre-iraq necon, i'm a post-libya liberal interventionist. i'm not advocating we unilaterally invade and replace a regime with an occupation, i'm advocating we support a rebelling population against a genocidal autocrat. surely you can see that syria parallels libya much more than it does iraq.

the u.s. has and in many ways still has a miserable foreign policy in the middle east. it fails to recognize that to the extent that it fights for the individual liberty of americans at the expense of others, it can count on endless reactionary conflicts that radicalize populations against america (blowback). but to the extent that america fights for the individual liberty of all and articulates that, it can count on massively outgunning threats in the battle for hearts and minds (libya).

that the u.s. has gotten foreign policy wrong so often in the past does not mean the u.s. can't and shouldn't start getting it right now. that self-interested interventions have failed in the past does not mean all interventions fail. i'll agree with "it never works" in those self-interested and misguided cases such as iraq, operation ajax, etc. but i will not agree that intervention never works. the gulf war, the kosovo war, and libya are all success stories. syria would be one, too.

Elliott: Chris, do you know who the rebels are? Are you so naive as to think that just because Assad is a bad guy that his various enemies are saints? I would not agree that Syria parallels Libya more than Iraq—on the contrary! Syria is ethnically and economically diverse and has long had a Sunni majority ruled by a tiny, nominally Shiite minority; in that way, Syria is much more like Iraq than Libya (Iraq's Sunni ruling class ruled over a large Shiite majority and Kurdish + Turkmen minorities). By contrast, Libya's tribes are fractured, but they are fairly homogeneous in terms of economic status and religion. Syria is a Pandora's box of competing interests linked to outside stakeholders (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey), at the crossroads of the Sunni and Shiite spheres of influence, far more strategically important than Libya. Hello—that's why it was a no-brainer to bomb Libya, for trigger happy NATO, but no one wants to touch Syria with a ten foot pole. America should fight for the individual liberty of all through soft power and by example, not by bombing other peoples' dictators. And how can we say we fight for the individual liberty of all when we supported men like Mubarak and the Shah until the bitter, bitter end? When we have prisoners held without being charged for years in Guantanamo Bay? When we kill hundreds of civilians with drone strikes in Pakistan? When we ensured the murders of tens of thousands by bolstering the most nefarious dictatorships in Latin America? "Getting foreign policy right" henceforth means leading by example, not by the sharp end of the spear. You cannot compare Syria to the Balkans (and by the way, the majority of the killing had already happened there by the time we intervened, and there are plenty of folks there who don't think American intervention worked out so well for them, and it's WAY to early to decide how Libya will work out, which, by the way, is a tiny country with a tiny population and abundant natural resources). I'm not sure you've given enough thought to what's at stake in a post-Assad Syria, and I do not mean to imply that I want to see Assad hang on, only that I think we need to let the Syrians fight their own revolution and allow an organic balance of power to rise from the ashes.

Chris Adell: i've spent a fair amount of time trying to answer "who the rebels are?" but no, i don't because no one does. anyone who says they know who is dominant in an admittedly amorphous and multifaceted group doesn't know what they're talking about.

that said, i wouldn't advocate intervention without first having studied the leadership of the free syrian army and syrian national council. the muslim brotherhood is well represented, but would not necessarily be dominant. on the ground, syria is much more susceptible to jihadist infiltration than other arab uprisings, which is actually one of the reasons i support intervention. time is on their side, and the longer we wait, the more radical and jihadist the rebels become. (and the more clout the MB has on the council, if the SNC is even relevant by the time this is all over.)

demographically, syria is neither like libya or iraq, but i wasn't speaking demographically. i was speaking about the parallel contexts for military intervention.

about the previous foreign policy failures, aka american support for tyrants, america will surely and rightly be received with the utmost skepticism by the arab street, but again, that the u.s. has gotten foreign policy wrong so often in the past does not mean the u.s. can't and shouldn't start getting it right now. and getting it right means both leading by example and carrying a big stick, or a big spear in your metaphor, and knowing when to use it.

i in no way was attempting to compare syria to the balkans, that was merely an counterfactual to your assertion that "it never works."

what is "organic" or "unorganic" balance of power is a senseless term with no regard for individual liberty. sometimes granting autonomy and agency to the citizens of the world means shifting the balance of power, and in those cases, i'm all for it.

Elliott: Chris, you sound like a DC wonk. Perhaps it's time for you to fly over to the Middle East and spend some time on actual Arab streets. Get a sense of how folks in the Middle East feel about US military intervention. Get a sense of how folks in the Middle East feel about the United States, period. While you're at it, spend some time with the US military and learn about the backbreaking, heartbreaking, and heretofore futile work of "delivering freedom to the world." Then come back and tell me that you think we ought to go bomb Assad's troops.

Chris Adell: the ultimate ad hominem trump card. you're right, then. i know nothing.

Elliott: Honestly you sound like Chris Hitchens, who for all of his brilliance let his ego get the best of him and provided frighteningly sound moral justification for Bush's war in Iraq. Sorry, but you simply can't protect people by bombing them.

Chris Adell: i'm flattered by the comparison. the consequences of a syrian intervention are all hypothetical suppositions so i can't say you're definitely right or wrong, but i wouldn't provoke you if i didn't appreciate your take. i'll leave it there.

Elliott: I wouldn't say it's an ad hominem trump card. It's just a pretty good idea to talk "to" the people that you're talking "for." I've spent much of the past four years in the Middle East, and another chunk of the last decade either in or alongside the military. So, if it's a trump card, it's not because it's ad hominem, it's just because it's true.

Chris Adell: fair enough.

Jack: I just don't want the government to have a reason for me to get recalled. Syria, figure your stuff out on your own because I have shit to do.

something syria this way comes?

Stringing some strings together, Anusar Farooqui over at The Policy Tensor insightfully picked up on a few clues that seem to building on each other pretty quickly.

There's a confluence of a few events coming together that seem like a pretty wild coincidence if you ask me. I mean hey, it could happen, I'm just saying it'd be a pretty big coincidence.

1. A couple weeks ago, the tide turned against the Syrian rebels with the loss of Qusayr, "crucial to supply routes for both sides". For obvious reasons, it's not in U.S. interests for the Syrian regime's army to be inching towards a more serious victory in Homs.
2. In the last couple weeks, the U.S. has begun a significant military build-up in Jordan and is keeping it relatively quiet, calling it a training exercise. Public statements about it seem to be a little erratic.
3. Today the U.S. publicly announced that the regime has crossed it's red line, and has used chemical weapons against the opposition.
4. The Iranian election is kicking off in just a few hours. While the election is a well-acknowledged joke, the Syrian regime's primary ally in the region is bound to be embroiled in its own domestic politics for the foreseeable short-term future. There would be no better time to act than while Iran is politically off-balance.

Like I said, I don't want imply an intervention in the near future is certain, but if you follow the public statements, the tone is changing. And while some things are just a coincidence, some things just aren't.

from latakia with love.

the revolution is at a tipping point with the fight raging for damascus and aleppo, syria's largest and second largest cities. the regime is hitting back, and my best guess is the regime will be repulsed in aleppo but largely successful in damascus, where the shabiha are being led by assad's brother.



of course with the free syrian army fighting a protracted guerilla campaign, as they should, success for the regime takes on a slightly complicated definition. the regime can certainly shell and retake neighborhoods at will, but if the rebels melt away only to return later, establishing legitimacy and lasting control will be difficult. i expect a protracted game of cat and mouse in the capital for awhile to come.

"The Free Syrian Army is moving quickly and well," said Moaz Shami, a leading activist in the capital. "But the road ahead is still long, and what the rebels did surpassed their abilities. I can't say that they will liberate Damascus."

many observers think we may actually be passed the tipping point, with july 18th's bombing of the national security headquarters marking the beginning of the end for assad. if that's true, (and i hope it is,) then what comes after? there seems to be two possible outcomes.

in my ideal scenario, the regime collapses in damascus, and the free syrian army deftly steers the discourse away from sectarian conflict.

"We are putting together a unit to protect the national museum, the central bank and especially Alawite districts against revenge attacks," says a rebel in Damascus. "There is still no shortage of volunteers even for that, thank God."

in this ideal scenario, the regime's stubbornness works against them. if assad refuses to leave damascus, a rebel victory in the capital could spell complete sovereignty over all of syria for the syrian national council, including the ethnically alawite areas.



in the unfavorable scenario, a shrewd assad steers syria into a sectarian civil war and retreats to an alawite refuge, as some rumors suggest he already has, to deny the rebels a complete victory. a lot of signs point to evidence that the planning for this, including ethnic cleansing, may already be underway.



this post was inspired by a post from anusar farooqui's policy tensor, which detailed the imperative for the rebels should they seek to craft a viable state in this scenario, namely maintaining access to a port. in weighing out the possibilities, i found a post from the syria comment the most compelling justification for why this unfavorable scenario won't happen.

to break it down very simply:

1. alawite urbanization.
2. alawite integration.
3. lack of infrastructure.
4. lack of diplomatic recognition.
5. strategic indefensibility.

of these, i totally disagree with 4. russia would rapidly recognize an alawite state, as well as continue to trade and arm the alawites in exchange for continued naval basing rights in tartus.

but i find myself agreeing pretty heavily with 5. i scoured the internet for 2004 syrian census data to examine the ethnic makeup of latakia and tartus, but so far, no dice since all the government websites are incommunicado. (surprise surprise.) still, from the post: "All the coastal cities remain majority Sunni to this day." while i don't take that quote as gospel, i would be very surprised if the large sunni minority, possibly the majority in some crucial urban centers, couldn't function as an effectively crippling fifth column within any potential alawite state.

that said, i suppose we shall have to wait and sea.



long live the free syrian army. ♥

a home in homs.

i ♥ guerilla warfare. so this one time i tweeted about wanting a benghazi-like stronghold for the rebels in syria, but if there's no international intervention to defend it, i guess it'll just have to be done the old fashioned way. stick and move, brothers... stick and move.

ramita navai.

so my cousin a million times removed ramita navai snuck into syria to get some dirt on the crackdown. it's funny to think that fantasies of conflict zones are in my blood, but who knows. i just saw her interview on anderson cooper about this...

Watch Syria Undercover on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

she does a lot of awesome journalism, keep poking around.

hamza.

if not for neda in iran, i'd say hamza seals the beginning of the end for al-assad.

i'll just hope.