red planet.

the 1994 cartoon miniseries that inspired me to read my first novel, robert heinlein's red planet. finally, after all these years...



willis is just as cute as i remember him. sigh... my heart is 14.33% mushier and my universe is now 2.17% closer to complete. praise jah! (and whoever uploaded this video.)

tracy morgan.

omfg...

r.i.p. ltte continued.

in august i wrote...

"Should Sri Lanka choose to continue to persecute its Tamil minority, the Sri Lankan government will carve a favorable epithet for the LTTE that will inspire continued unconventional warfare. Should Sri Lanka instead choose to come to terms with its own mistakes and delegitimize the grassroots support for the often brutal LTTE by ensuring equal treatment for the Tamil minority, the end of the Tamil Tigers could be the beginning of an enduring and welcome peace in Sri Lanka."

this probably wont help.

slow motion for me continued.

my favoritest.

banana phone continued.

the htc ads are so amazing. kudos deutsch, this is how you sell a phone...





i came so ridiculously close to getting the htc hero, but wowww. i would show you the ad, but its actually kind of embarrassing by comparison.

the phone i affectionately knew by its developmental codename, "rachael," is officially set to be released in the us q1 of 2010 as the sony ericsson xperia x10.

as i promised in my last banana phone post, i will wait for her.

ub ah scumee.

ub- ah scumee... sorry i just had a huge kil- ub- basa for lunch. ub- ah...

slow motion for me.

the theme for today is... slow motion! k? got it? now hold onto it. its wiggling! keep it steady! did you drop it? no? good job. ok now watch...











you still have it right? ok great. now put it in your mouth.

an enriching engagement with iran.

an op-ed i wrote on iran...

An Enriching Engagement with Iran

Iran is having a blast stringing nuclear negotiations along, but this isn’t your typical bazaar negotiation and the world’s patience should rightly be wearing thin. Iran has a rare opportunity for a détente with the West, and opportunity is knocking hard, but Iran seems content to keep the world waiting for its ultimate response. The Obama administration has ushered in a unique US attempt to engage Iran with remarkable patience, but at this point, that patience is bordering on naïve.

Iran has a history of deceptively flouting international agreements. An Iranian dissident group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. In the run-up to the current negotiations, Iran was forced to admit the existence of yet another nuclear enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom. All of these revelations fly in the face of Iran’s obligation to notify the IAEA according to international agreements. Ongoing government-sponsored chants of “death to America” probably haven’t helped much either.

The revelation of Iran’s most recent deception has provoked stronger resolve in the West and a much tougher stance from the UK, France, and Germany. It has persuaded even its more amicable partners to reconsider their stance on the nuclear issue. Russia, one of the first nations to recognize Ahmadinejad after his joke of an electoral victory, has implicitly understood that Iran must make concessions by backing the IAEA deal.

The deal would have Iran outsource the most suspect phase of the uranium enrichment process to Russia and France, by shipping its low-enriched uranium to be further enriched abroad and returned to Iran as fuel for a nuclear medicine facility. One primary purpose of the deal is to remove enough of Iran’s uranium to bring the amount below the “breakout threshold,” the amount needed to produce a nuclear weapon, but Iran has indicated it will not agree to ship that amount of uranium all at once. Iran has instead proposed multiple shipments over time, negating one of the deal’s primary functions, the ability to deprive Iran of the threshold.

Iran is stringing the international community along for a ride, pushing back and ignoring deadlines, and it is getting away with it. The only consequence so far has been more time for Iran to continue its nuclear program. The original deadline for Iran to respond to the IAEA draft proposal was October 24th, but Iran is still equivocating and has not provided an official response. In the meantime, Iran’s conservative leaders have continued their game of “who can be more anti-Western,” which now has the parliament engaged in a variant of this game called “who can be more anti-UN brokered nuclear compromise.”

Enough is enough. As persistent opposition protests continue, an illegitimate regime is having a blast stringing the world along, and even the Iranian opposition movement is getting fed up. Iranian protestors hijacked the government-sponsored rally celebrating the taking of US hostages to chant “Obama, are you with them or are you with us?” It’s time to give Iran real consequences for its continued deception.

yes we can (lower our standards).

an op-ed i wrote on afghanistan...

Yes We Can (Lower Our Standards)

As the Afghanistan policy debate continues behind closed doors in Washington, I’ve been putting together the pieces of the Obama administration’s emerging Afghanistan strategy. I’ve written about Afghanistan before, and I’ll make no effort to hide what I believe: Counter-insurgency is nothing to be sheepish about. Obama should give General McChrystal all the troops he needs.

But as I read the headlines yesterday, Obama’s message of hope didn’t seem to apply to Afghanistan. One AP headline that stood out was “Obama focusing on al-Qaida, not Taliban.” It seems like the strategy is basically “Yes we can,” but only if we lower our standards. With a war weary public, I can understand the temptation to water down the objectives, but if history has taught us anything, it’s that seeking accommodation with Islamic militants is never a good idea. That’s how the Taliban came to power in the first place, and we’re still cleaning up that mess.

The U.S. aided and abetted the Islamic militants against the Soviet Union in the 80s, and turned a blind eye to Afghanistan once the project against the Soviets had run its course. The Soviet Union, in a curiously similar position to what the U.S. is facing now, watered down their objectives in Afghanistan after an unsuccessful attempt to hunt down Islamic militants along the Pakistan-Afghan border. As war weariness set in, the Soviets pulled back from the countryside and garrisoned the cities, gradually replacing their troops with Afghans.

The strategy worked in the short-run, and the cities held against the American-backed Islamic militants. Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah consolidated his control of the cities, much as President Hamid Karzai is doing now, mockingly earning him the title, “the Mayor of Kabul.” Najibullah also pursued the same strategy Obama seems to be proposing now, national reconciliation with the Taliban. With Najibullah in control of the cities and “peaceful” reintegration of the Taliban underway, the Soviets and the Americans packed up and went home. A few years later, the Taliban took Kabul.

So what went wrong? Well for starters, the Taliban’s ideology is a mixture of Wahabbism and pan-Islamism. Wahabbism advocates a strict interpretation of Islam and renders it permissible to kill non-adherents or “infidels,” which includes most of the world and even countless other Muslims. Pan-Islamism advocates the unification of all Muslims under one Islamic government, which would require the overthrow of countless peaceful governments across the Middle East. (I hear nuclear-armed Pakistan is looking good these days.) Does this sound like an amenable ideology that can be effectively mollified through power sharing?

For a more recent case, take a look at Pakistan’s Taliban experiment. The Pakistani government, secular by most accounts, has always been mixed up with Islamic militancy. They courted Islamic militants along with America against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and they used Islamic militants against India in Kashmir. Like America, lately they’ve been dealing with some serious blowback. Unfortunately for Pakistan, their threat is existential. One unintended consequence of the war in Afghanistan was to push thousands of Taliban into the already restive provinces of northwest Pakistan, further destabilizing its already shaky political foundations.

So last February, Pakistan tried a truce. Also last February, I wrote in my blog condemning it. Pakistan allowed the Taliban to create a haven in the Swat Valley, permitting the Taliban to govern and even implement their sick version of sharia law. (No Michael Jackson memorials.) After dozens of terrorist bombings and hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilian deaths, a cursory glance at the headlines shows how well that worked out.

So again, what went wrong? Well they can’t say I didn’t warn them. The Taliban’s radical Islamist ideology has never been pacified by letting them have their own little corner of the world. They’re not exactly the type of people who understand timeout in the corner (of the country). I hope the Obama administration keeps that in mind as the Afghanistan policy debate continues.

If a watered-down version of counter-insurgency does indeed become the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, let me say that I’ll leave room for error and sincerely hope that I’m wrong. Unfortunately, I’ve been right about this before. In my humble opinion, appeasing the Taliban failed for the Soviet Union, placating the Taliban failed for Pakistan, and giving a failed strategy one more try doesn’t exactly deserve the Nobel Peace Prize.

the end of 21st century isolationism – unilateralism.

an op-ed i wrote on unilateralism...

The End of 21st Century Isolationism – Unilateralism

I just watched Obama’s UN speech, and it was everything I voted for. Obama has inherited a weakened America facing immense challenges, but despite my domestic policy disagreements, I am thoroughly impressed. Obama’s speech at the UN said everything that needed to be said, including an implicit apology for America’s missteps into the 21st century.

During the 2000 presidential primaries, I shuddered in fear when then Governor Bush was confronted by reporters on his lack of foreign affairs knowledge. I watched in disbelief as he failed foreign affairs quiz after foreign affairs quiz, frequently unable to answer questions that even I could answer just barely half way through high school.

I think at that point, a more humble person’s embarrassment might lead them to question whether they should really be pursuing the most powerful office in the world, but as we would all learn, Bush isn’t really the humble type. I decided during the primaries, when there was still a relatively wide field of candidates, that I would hope for only one thing… George W. Bush would not become president.

Well, that didn’t work out so well. I was still consoling myself with the relative stability of global politics when hijacked planes hit the World Trade Center in 2001. Now a conflict of epic proportions was emerging that intimately involved leaders like Pervez Musharraf, whose names eluded Bush just a year earlier. The path was predictable. Bush’s personal ignorance of foreign affairs yielded self-centered American policies that demonstrated a similar ignorance.

Bush made important foreign policy decisions by talking to God and trusting his gut, which a more scientific person might rightly describe as the amygdala’s projections onto the gut. (Think “fight or flight.”) Consequently, his policies used fear to send America’s amygdala into overdrive, and for the sake of simplicity and expediency, even people who knew better accepted the flawed perspective of foreign policy challenges existing in a vacuum.

As much as I appreciate that Bush rightly lambasted isolationism, sometimes in disagreement with his own party, Bush got it terribly wrong. In the days of Chamberlain, Churchill, and Hitler, Bush’s condemnation of isolationism would have confirmed the courage he saw in the mirror, but what Bush didn’t realize was that it wasn’t World War II and his detractors weren’t present day Neville Chamberlains. Bush was on the wrong side of history, just as Neville Chamberlain was. In today’s interconnected world, unilateralism is the new isolationism.

The flaw of isolationism in the 20th century was the false view that domestic affairs could exist in a vacuum, and a state could act without regard for consequences beyond its borders. It was promoted by oversimplifying foreign affairs, and subverting logical appraisals in favor of the instinctive amygdala. Sure enough, ignoring foreign affairs in the run up to World War II came at a sobering cost.

The flaw of unilateralism in the 21st century is the false view that international relations can exist in a vacuum, and a state can act unilaterally without regard for consequences on a global scale. It too is promoted by oversimplifying foreign affairs and subverting reason and deliberation in favor of “fight or flight.” The invasion of Afghanistan has destabilized a nuclear armed Pakistan, and the invasion of Iraq has strengthened Iran in numerous ways, the direst being America’s loss of credibility in enforcing the non-proliferation of WMD.

Luckily that chapter of American foreign policy is over, and hopefully for good. Obama’s UN speech described a radically different approach to international relations, centered on the recognition that 21st century challenges are global in nature and thus require global cooperation and compromise. America is still the preeminent power in the world, and Obama made it clear in no uncertain terms that he will serve the interests of his constituents, but his global perspective finally realizes something unilateralism didn’t: Our interests are shared, and best served through multilateralism.

waging peace in afghanistan.

an op-ed i wrote on afghanistan...

Waging Peace in Afghanistan

When it comes to winning the peace, the U.S. doesn’t have the best record, and when it comes to learning foreign policy lessons, the U.S. seems to have a steep learning curve. When major combat operations are over, the conflict is in many ways just beginning. The U.S. may not have learned the hard way, but America certainly found out the hard way after the 1980’s effort to supply the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Despite the frustration of many involved, the U.S. turned its back on the reconstruction after it drove the Soviets from Afghanistan, and left a vacuum that was occupied by the most brutal of the rebels, the Taliban.

After the blowback from a forgotten Afghanistan hit the U.S. on September 11th, 2001, one might think military planners would realize that military victory is only a means to an ultimately political end. It is in the U.S.’s interests to see a secure, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan. However when the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan a month after September 11th, it had a troop commitment of only 1,300. When the Taliban fell, there were only 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Though Afghanistan is a very different story than Iraq, the biggest mistake was similar.

The U.S.’s erroneous beliefs concerning the Iraq War’s immediate aftermath established a poor start for its most ambitious nation-building endeavor since World War II. Blind faith in the now defunct opinions of Iraqi exiles, who assured US officials that they would be “greeted as liberators,” caused them to neglect the need for a post war plan to maintain order following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In what has been called a “catastrophic victory,” the U.S. was so focused on and so good at winning the war that it had forgotten about and wasn’t ready for winning the peace.

In the absence of a plan to win the peace, Iraq was a power vacuum. Scenes of chaos and looting filled the airwaves. The basic functions of the now absent state, such as protection of property, were opportunistically undertaken by Iraqi opposition groups, greatly consolidating their power. Unconcerned with and often openly hostile to U.S. interests, these groups found themselves in firm command and control of enclaves within Iraq to an extent rivaling the control of the U.S., CPA, and eventually the new Iraqi government.

Luckily the tide turned when General Petraeus took over. General Petraeus understands that victory in Iraq is not only a military challenge, and he inspired his soldiers by asking “What have you done for the people of Iraq today?” It is a good sign for Afghanistan that the similarly perceptive General Stanley McChrystal has assumed command there. He works closely with Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and is concerned with the well-being of the Afghan people. And it doesn’t hurt that he is an expert in counter-insurgency and special operations.

Today there are about 63,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, more than double the previous year’s amount as part of President Obama’s escalation strategy, but more may be needed. If one follows the polls, it seems war weariness is on the rise just as a torrent of other issues is overshadowing Afghanistan, but now is a critical time for Afghanistan and it is important America doesn’t repeat the mistakes of the past and let Afghanistan go adrift. As the memory of another September 11th anniversary fades, don’t forget the importance of Afghanistan, historically and presently. As I once argued for the President and Congress to give Petraeus all the resources he needed in Iraq, it is now time to give McChrystal all the resources he needs in Afghanistan.