the htc ads are so amazing. kudos deutsch, this is how you sell a phone...
i came so ridiculously close to getting the htc hero, but wowww. i would show you the ad, but its actually kind of embarrassing by comparison.
the phone i affectionately knew by its developmental codename, "rachael," is officially set to be released in the us q1 of 2010 as the sony ericsson xperia x10.
as i promised in my last banana phone post, i will wait for her.
Monday, December 7, 2009
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
slow motion for me.
the theme for today is... slow motion! k? got it? now hold onto it. its wiggling! keep it steady! did you drop it? no? good job. ok now watch...
you still have it right? ok great. now put it in your mouth.
you still have it right? ok great. now put it in your mouth.
Monday, November 16, 2009
an enriching engagement with iran.
an op-ed i wrote on iran...
An Enriching Engagement with Iran
Iran is having a blast stringing nuclear negotiations along, but this isn’t your typical bazaar negotiation and the world’s patience should rightly be wearing thin. Iran has a rare opportunity for a détente with the West, and opportunity is knocking hard, but Iran seems content to keep the world waiting for its ultimate response. The Obama administration has ushered in a unique US attempt to engage Iran with remarkable patience, but at this point, that patience is bordering on naïve.
Iran has a history of deceptively flouting international agreements. An Iranian dissident group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. In the run-up to the current negotiations, Iran was forced to admit the existence of yet another nuclear enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom. All of these revelations fly in the face of Iran’s obligation to notify the IAEA according to international agreements. Ongoing government-sponsored chants of “death to America” probably haven’t helped much either.
The revelation of Iran’s most recent deception has provoked stronger resolve in the West and a much tougher stance from the UK, France, and Germany. It has persuaded even its more amicable partners to reconsider their stance on the nuclear issue. Russia, one of the first nations to recognize Ahmadinejad after his joke of an electoral victory, has implicitly understood that Iran must make concessions by backing the IAEA deal.
The deal would have Iran outsource the most suspect phase of the uranium enrichment process to Russia and France, by shipping its low-enriched uranium to be further enriched abroad and returned to Iran as fuel for a nuclear medicine facility. One primary purpose of the deal is to remove enough of Iran’s uranium to bring the amount below the “breakout threshold,” the amount needed to produce a nuclear weapon, but Iran has indicated it will not agree to ship that amount of uranium all at once. Iran has instead proposed multiple shipments over time, negating one of the deal’s primary functions, the ability to deprive Iran of the threshold.
Iran is stringing the international community along for a ride, pushing back and ignoring deadlines, and it is getting away with it. The only consequence so far has been more time for Iran to continue its nuclear program. The original deadline for Iran to respond to the IAEA draft proposal was October 24th, but Iran is still equivocating and has not provided an official response. In the meantime, Iran’s conservative leaders have continued their game of “who can be more anti-Western,” which now has the parliament engaged in a variant of this game called “who can be more anti-UN brokered nuclear compromise.”
Enough is enough. As persistent opposition protests continue, an illegitimate regime is having a blast stringing the world along, and even the Iranian opposition movement is getting fed up. Iranian protestors hijacked the government-sponsored rally celebrating the taking of US hostages to chant “Obama, are you with them or are you with us?” It’s time to give Iran real consequences for its continued deception.
An Enriching Engagement with Iran
Iran is having a blast stringing nuclear negotiations along, but this isn’t your typical bazaar negotiation and the world’s patience should rightly be wearing thin. Iran has a rare opportunity for a détente with the West, and opportunity is knocking hard, but Iran seems content to keep the world waiting for its ultimate response. The Obama administration has ushered in a unique US attempt to engage Iran with remarkable patience, but at this point, that patience is bordering on naïve.
Iran has a history of deceptively flouting international agreements. An Iranian dissident group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. In the run-up to the current negotiations, Iran was forced to admit the existence of yet another nuclear enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom. All of these revelations fly in the face of Iran’s obligation to notify the IAEA according to international agreements. Ongoing government-sponsored chants of “death to America” probably haven’t helped much either.
The revelation of Iran’s most recent deception has provoked stronger resolve in the West and a much tougher stance from the UK, France, and Germany. It has persuaded even its more amicable partners to reconsider their stance on the nuclear issue. Russia, one of the first nations to recognize Ahmadinejad after his joke of an electoral victory, has implicitly understood that Iran must make concessions by backing the IAEA deal.
The deal would have Iran outsource the most suspect phase of the uranium enrichment process to Russia and France, by shipping its low-enriched uranium to be further enriched abroad and returned to Iran as fuel for a nuclear medicine facility. One primary purpose of the deal is to remove enough of Iran’s uranium to bring the amount below the “breakout threshold,” the amount needed to produce a nuclear weapon, but Iran has indicated it will not agree to ship that amount of uranium all at once. Iran has instead proposed multiple shipments over time, negating one of the deal’s primary functions, the ability to deprive Iran of the threshold.
Iran is stringing the international community along for a ride, pushing back and ignoring deadlines, and it is getting away with it. The only consequence so far has been more time for Iran to continue its nuclear program. The original deadline for Iran to respond to the IAEA draft proposal was October 24th, but Iran is still equivocating and has not provided an official response. In the meantime, Iran’s conservative leaders have continued their game of “who can be more anti-Western,” which now has the parliament engaged in a variant of this game called “who can be more anti-UN brokered nuclear compromise.”
Enough is enough. As persistent opposition protests continue, an illegitimate regime is having a blast stringing the world along, and even the Iranian opposition movement is getting fed up. Iranian protestors hijacked the government-sponsored rally celebrating the taking of US hostages to chant “Obama, are you with them or are you with us?” It’s time to give Iran real consequences for its continued deception.
Friday, October 9, 2009
yes we can (lower our standards).
an op-ed i wrote on afghanistan...
Yes We Can (Lower Our Standards)
As the Afghanistan policy debate continues behind closed doors in Washington, I’ve been putting together the pieces of the Obama administration’s emerging Afghanistan strategy. I’ve written about Afghanistan before, and I’ll make no effort to hide what I believe: Counter-insurgency is nothing to be sheepish about. Obama should give General McChrystal all the troops he needs.
But as I read the headlines yesterday, Obama’s message of hope didn’t seem to apply to Afghanistan. One AP headline that stood out was “Obama focusing on al-Qaida, not Taliban.” It seems like the strategy is basically “Yes we can,” but only if we lower our standards. With a war weary public, I can understand the temptation to water down the objectives, but if history has taught us anything, it’s that seeking accommodation with Islamic militants is never a good idea. That’s how the Taliban came to power in the first place, and we’re still cleaning up that mess.
The U.S. aided and abetted the Islamic militants against the Soviet Union in the 80s, and turned a blind eye to Afghanistan once the project against the Soviets had run its course. The Soviet Union, in a curiously similar position to what the U.S. is facing now, watered down their objectives in Afghanistan after an unsuccessful attempt to hunt down Islamic militants along the Pakistan-Afghan border. As war weariness set in, the Soviets pulled back from the countryside and garrisoned the cities, gradually replacing their troops with Afghans.
The strategy worked in the short-run, and the cities held against the American-backed Islamic militants. Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah consolidated his control of the cities, much as President Hamid Karzai is doing now, mockingly earning him the title, “the Mayor of Kabul.” Najibullah also pursued the same strategy Obama seems to be proposing now, national reconciliation with the Taliban. With Najibullah in control of the cities and “peaceful” reintegration of the Taliban underway, the Soviets and the Americans packed up and went home. A few years later, the Taliban took Kabul.
So what went wrong? Well for starters, the Taliban’s ideology is a mixture of Wahabbism and pan-Islamism. Wahabbism advocates a strict interpretation of Islam and renders it permissible to kill non-adherents or “infidels,” which includes most of the world and even countless other Muslims. Pan-Islamism advocates the unification of all Muslims under one Islamic government, which would require the overthrow of countless peaceful governments across the Middle East. (I hear nuclear-armed Pakistan is looking good these days.) Does this sound like an amenable ideology that can be effectively mollified through power sharing?
For a more recent case, take a look at Pakistan’s Taliban experiment. The Pakistani government, secular by most accounts, has always been mixed up with Islamic militancy. They courted Islamic militants along with America against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and they used Islamic militants against India in Kashmir. Like America, lately they’ve been dealing with some serious blowback. Unfortunately for Pakistan, their threat is existential. One unintended consequence of the war in Afghanistan was to push thousands of Taliban into the already restive provinces of northwest Pakistan, further destabilizing its already shaky political foundations.
So last February, Pakistan tried a truce. Also last February, I wrote in my blog condemning it. Pakistan allowed the Taliban to create a haven in the Swat Valley, permitting the Taliban to govern and even implement their sick version of sharia law. (No Michael Jackson memorials.) After dozens of terrorist bombings and hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilian deaths, a cursory glance at the headlines shows how well that worked out.
So again, what went wrong? Well they can’t say I didn’t warn them. The Taliban’s radical Islamist ideology has never been pacified by letting them have their own little corner of the world. They’re not exactly the type of people who understand timeout in the corner (of the country). I hope the Obama administration keeps that in mind as the Afghanistan policy debate continues.
If a watered-down version of counter-insurgency does indeed become the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, let me say that I’ll leave room for error and sincerely hope that I’m wrong. Unfortunately, I’ve been right about this before. In my humble opinion, appeasing the Taliban failed for the Soviet Union, placating the Taliban failed for Pakistan, and giving a failed strategy one more try doesn’t exactly deserve the Nobel Peace Prize.
Yes We Can (Lower Our Standards)
As the Afghanistan policy debate continues behind closed doors in Washington, I’ve been putting together the pieces of the Obama administration’s emerging Afghanistan strategy. I’ve written about Afghanistan before, and I’ll make no effort to hide what I believe: Counter-insurgency is nothing to be sheepish about. Obama should give General McChrystal all the troops he needs.
But as I read the headlines yesterday, Obama’s message of hope didn’t seem to apply to Afghanistan. One AP headline that stood out was “Obama focusing on al-Qaida, not Taliban.” It seems like the strategy is basically “Yes we can,” but only if we lower our standards. With a war weary public, I can understand the temptation to water down the objectives, but if history has taught us anything, it’s that seeking accommodation with Islamic militants is never a good idea. That’s how the Taliban came to power in the first place, and we’re still cleaning up that mess.
The U.S. aided and abetted the Islamic militants against the Soviet Union in the 80s, and turned a blind eye to Afghanistan once the project against the Soviets had run its course. The Soviet Union, in a curiously similar position to what the U.S. is facing now, watered down their objectives in Afghanistan after an unsuccessful attempt to hunt down Islamic militants along the Pakistan-Afghan border. As war weariness set in, the Soviets pulled back from the countryside and garrisoned the cities, gradually replacing their troops with Afghans.
The strategy worked in the short-run, and the cities held against the American-backed Islamic militants. Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah consolidated his control of the cities, much as President Hamid Karzai is doing now, mockingly earning him the title, “the Mayor of Kabul.” Najibullah also pursued the same strategy Obama seems to be proposing now, national reconciliation with the Taliban. With Najibullah in control of the cities and “peaceful” reintegration of the Taliban underway, the Soviets and the Americans packed up and went home. A few years later, the Taliban took Kabul.
So what went wrong? Well for starters, the Taliban’s ideology is a mixture of Wahabbism and pan-Islamism. Wahabbism advocates a strict interpretation of Islam and renders it permissible to kill non-adherents or “infidels,” which includes most of the world and even countless other Muslims. Pan-Islamism advocates the unification of all Muslims under one Islamic government, which would require the overthrow of countless peaceful governments across the Middle East. (I hear nuclear-armed Pakistan is looking good these days.) Does this sound like an amenable ideology that can be effectively mollified through power sharing?
For a more recent case, take a look at Pakistan’s Taliban experiment. The Pakistani government, secular by most accounts, has always been mixed up with Islamic militancy. They courted Islamic militants along with America against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and they used Islamic militants against India in Kashmir. Like America, lately they’ve been dealing with some serious blowback. Unfortunately for Pakistan, their threat is existential. One unintended consequence of the war in Afghanistan was to push thousands of Taliban into the already restive provinces of northwest Pakistan, further destabilizing its already shaky political foundations.
So last February, Pakistan tried a truce. Also last February, I wrote in my blog condemning it. Pakistan allowed the Taliban to create a haven in the Swat Valley, permitting the Taliban to govern and even implement their sick version of sharia law. (No Michael Jackson memorials.) After dozens of terrorist bombings and hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilian deaths, a cursory glance at the headlines shows how well that worked out.
So again, what went wrong? Well they can’t say I didn’t warn them. The Taliban’s radical Islamist ideology has never been pacified by letting them have their own little corner of the world. They’re not exactly the type of people who understand timeout in the corner (of the country). I hope the Obama administration keeps that in mind as the Afghanistan policy debate continues.
If a watered-down version of counter-insurgency does indeed become the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, let me say that I’ll leave room for error and sincerely hope that I’m wrong. Unfortunately, I’ve been right about this before. In my humble opinion, appeasing the Taliban failed for the Soviet Union, placating the Taliban failed for Pakistan, and giving a failed strategy one more try doesn’t exactly deserve the Nobel Peace Prize.
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